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INCENTIVE PROBLEMS IN THE CENTRALLY
PLANNED ECONOMY OF HUNGARY
LAJOS H E T H Y  and CSABA MAKO
Th e  H ungarian  economic reform, in­troduced in 1968, has been properly considered a m ajor shift from centraliza­tion to decentralization, representing perhaps the most radical postwar change in the economic m odel of any Eastern European country. I t  is obvious, how­ever, that the functioning of a traditional economic system cannot be basically changed from one day to the next: obstacles to the operation of the new model in  H ungary had been accum ulat­ing for about two decades and still exist, both in the economy and the society. T he  purpose of this article is to describe some of the difficult aspects of the period of transition.
After having experienced a dynamic period of extensive industrialization, in 1968 H ungary substituted for its strongly centralized m odel of planned economy a
T h e  goal of th e  H u n g arian  econom ic refo rm  of 1968 was to accelerate th e  g row th  of in d ustria l p roductiv ity  by p ro v id in g  m anagers w ith  m ore a u th o rity  in  p lan n in g  an d  ad m in is te rin g  the o perations of th e ir  com panies. D irect an d  d e­ta iled  in structions by cen tra l agencies were re ­placed by general cen tra l regu la tions. O ne aim  of the new  econom ic m odel was to  encourage b e tte r  perform ance by w orkers th ro u g h  the in tro d u c tio n  of im proved  m oney incentives. T h is  objective has n o t been  achieved yet, for w ork d is­cip lin e an d  w ork in tensity  rem ain  loose in  m any  enterprises. T h is  artic le  exam ines w ork p e rfo r­m ance an d  incentive p lans in  th ree com panies in  an  effort to  iden tify  the socioeconomic condi­tions an d  influences responsib le for th e ir diffi­culties in  im proving  w ork perform ance.Lajos H ethy  an d  Csaba M ak6 are m em bers of the In s titu te  of Sociology, H u n g a rian  Academy of Sciences.— E d i t o r
less centralized one, which was some­where between the centralized and de­centralized extremes. T he  change was carried out on the proposition that the m ajor lines of structural developm ent and income distribu tion s h o u ld  be planned by central agencies, b u t a m ar­ket system should be created which would perm it decentralized determ ina­tion of methods of carrying ou t the pro­gram. T h e  distribu tion of disposable income between m ajor occupational and income groups was to be determ ined by the central agencies; to tal fixed invest­m ent in the economy and the shares to be directed to a few specific growth sec­tors and to m ajor areas of social invest­m ent were to be decided by the central authorities; b u t the d istribu tion  of the rem ainder of investm ent and the dis­tribu tion  of income w ith in  the central limits would be determ ined by the eco­nomic organizations and by the market.T h e  carefully prepared p ro g ra m , aim ed at intensive developm ent by ac­celerating the growth of industrial pro­ductivity, brought increased independ­ence for economic organizations; it replaced direct and detailed instructions by central agencies w ith indirect and comprehensive central regulations, giv­ing more power to managers in form ulat­ing the strategy of their companies. T hus, the perm anent in tervention of central organs was replaced, at least partially, by the orienting role of a somewhat
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liberalized m arket and by the in troduc­tion of profit incentives for managers. T he  labor m arket also experienced re­laxation of restraints.1
In  the previous model the central agencies had the staggering tasks of set­ting prices arbitrarily; investigating all production possibilities and determ ining the package to be chosen; and ensuring that the managers actually followed in ­structions. T his practice greatly pro­m oted industrialization bu t seriously im paired efficiency. Since 1968, some prices have continued to be centrally fixed, bu t others have been lim ited only in range, while the rem ainder have been allowed to change m arket conditions. Managers have been given more au thor­ity in choosing a profit-maximizing pack­age from their production-possibility set, although certain aspects of their activities have rem ained under strict control, such as decisions concerning the level of wages. Profits have been introduced as the most im portant indicator of the efficiency of organizations, and as an incentive for managers, a share of profits has been turned into differential incentive bonus­es. W orkers, whose movements were strictly lim ited in the previous model, have had complete freedom to choose jobs for themselves. In  short, the new system is intended to give im petus to the initiative of individuals and groups en­gaged in production and to free the central agencies from concern w ith the details of the economy which determ ine
'I n  the 1950s the dynam ic process of in d u s­tria lization  was based on  ag ricu ltu re : i t  p u m p ed  surp lus farm  labor in to  factories an d  profits accum ulated  by farm s in to  in d ustria l invest­m ents. In d u stria l grow th  resu lted  m ostly from  th e  increase in  m anpow er, w ith  only very slight technological progress. C om plem entary  invest­m ents an d  m ain tenance were neglected. T h e n  in  the 1960s, th e  reserves of ag ricu ltu re  were exhausted .
neither its structure nor the pace of its general development.
Labor Efficiency
T he  positive effects of the new model have been felt in the economy; however, at the same time, the serious difficulties in work efficiency, which prevailed under the former model, have continued. Dis­cipline in the work place has rem ained poor, and work intensity continues to be loose in many state-owned companies. Therefore, several attractive theoretical and practical problems have emerged for economists and sociologists to discuss. T o  w hat extent can current difficulties in work perform ance be a ttribu ted  to the heritage of the previous model in  the in ternal structure and in  the general socioeconomic circumstances of economic organizations? More g e n e ra l ly ,  w h a t structural obstacles have to be overcome by a new m odel so that its m axim um  positive effects may be felt? T o  w hat ex­tent are possible contradictions and rigid­ities in the new model responsible for the existing difficulties, and w hat is the relationship of these negative features to the heritage of the past?A lthough it is beyond our ken to an­swer these questions fully, we have tried to contribute to their clarification by a sociological investigation, which was started in 1968 and has since been com­pleted. We have focused our a ttention  on only one target of the new m odel—the introduction of more efficient money in­centives for workers to encourage better performance. In  the course of our re­search, the progress and the obstacles to realization of this incentive program have been exam ined in three state-owned engineering companies.2
-T h is a rtic le  presents a second analysis of the same topic by the au th o rs. In  con trast to  the p resen t focus on  m acro-socioeconom ic factors,
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Objectives and Methods
In  our investigation we have under­taken the following tasks: to judge the relative level of efficiency of the incentive systems (£) at the three companies since 1968; to exam ine the relationship be­tween E  and those socioeconomic factors in the in ternal structure and the outside environm ent that m ight have had an effect on the incentive systems at these three companies; and to in v e s t ig a te  (among the factors of outside environ­ment) the role of the central regulations that have come in to  existence as part of 
the new economic model.O ur approach to E  was in line with scientific m anagem ent m otivation theory. Despite our awareness of its shortcom ­ings, we have found it a source of inspira­tion. O ur standpoint on incentive systems was that an obviously poorly form ulated wage plan can never be a success, al­though a seemingly perfect incentive sys­
tem can sometimes be a failure.In Hungary the practice of the Stak- hanovist movement in  the 1950s3 and our own investigations carried ou t in  1969-71
the previous artic le  exam ined  m icro  factors w ith in  one com pany. ITserves as a basis fo r some statem ents in  th e  presen t artic le . See Lajos H ethy  and  Csaba M ak6, “O bstacles to the In tro d u c tio n  of Efficient M oney Incentives in  a H u n g arian  Factory,” Industria l and L abor R elations R eview , Vol. 24, No. 4 (July  1971), pp . 541-553.“T h e  flagrant injustices in  wages an d  the arb itra rily  created  privileges, however, resulted  in  grave conflicts am ong w orkers an d  betw een workers, on  one h an d , and  trad e  u n ion , party, and  m anagem ent on th e  o ther. Stakhanovists usually were a rb itra rily  created  “heroes o f w ork,” often p roducing  th e ir  o u ts tan d in g  ind iv idual p roduction  results w ith  the h e lp  of several d is­guised assistants an d  by o th er m eans, co n trad ic t­ing fa ir play. T h e  o th er workers desperately- tried  to  keep pace w ith  them , b u t of course they were always lagging b eh ind . I t m ust be m en ­tioned th a t considerable differences in  wTages, w hether fa ir o r u n fa ir , always lead  to  conflicts which m anagers have to face if they endeavor to  make incentive systems efficient.
have proved the existence of a very high m otivational relationship between wages and workers’ production. U nder such conditions the em ploym ent of a straight piece-rate system, if possible, seems to be the best m ethod of m otivating labor. T o  investigate these hypotheses, three com­panies were chosen with one th ing in common: the characteristics of their technological processes made the employ­m ent of such incentives rational and possible.T hus, the relative levels of efficiency of the wage plans in  the three organiza­tions have been determ ined by com pari­son to a theoretically ideal one. T he  results also have been checked by the relative levels of work discipline and work intensity, which are im portant, al­though indirect, reflections of E.In our approach to the set of socio­economic factors influencing the com­panies’ behavior in the realization of the incentive program , we have tried to cover as large a sphere as we could. Among the large num ber of in teracting and some­times overlapping factors, we concen­trated our a ttention  on the following im portant ones: (1) relations of the com­panies’ m anagem ent and labor force (intram anagem ent and m anagement-la­bor relations of powers, workers’ a tti­tudes concerning production, etc.); (2) the economic positions of the companies (their m arket situation, production costs, technological efficiency, state subven­tions, etc.); and (3) national restrictive measures (central control over wages per capita, the functioning of the profit-shar­ing system, etc.). In  our opinion, the efficiency of wage incentives and the relevant behavior of the companies have always been determ ined by a specific constellation of the above factors.O ur methods of investigation included an analysis of docum ents and data from
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the files of the companies, unstructured interviews, and case studies.
Incentive Systems ofDifferent Efficiencies
A brief description of the three com­panies follows. Company A A  is situated in the mostly agricultural area of western Hungary; it has about 15,000 employees and m anufactures railway coaches, tank wagons, differential gears, axles, steering gears, and chassis for trucks and buses. Company BB  has its headquarters in the highly industrialized capital of the coun­try; it employs about 5,000 people and produces several thousand types of m ed­ical instrum ents. Company CC is also situated in the capital; it has about 700 workers and produces a special type of electrical instrum ent.At Company A A, the construction of the incentive system, at least in principle, has been efficient. T h e  workers carry out their tasks mostly in groups and are paid directly on the basis of how m uch they produce (with the exception of a few departm ents). For the most part, there is neither a lower lim it (guaranteed level) nor an upper lim it (ceiling) for wages. T h e  m anagem ent of the company, how­ever, exercises strict control over piece rates. A series of piece-rate cuts (10.4 percent in 1964, 9.4 percent in 1965, 6.9 percent in  1966, 19.5 percent in 1969, etc.) seems to have served the purpose of keeping production standards stable. In  general, the functioning of the incentive system has been a success for the past few years, although a num ber of workers have carried ou t cyclical slowdowns from time to time, and the ratio  of labor tu rn ­over has been rather high. T h e  negative symptoms have been prim arily due to the practice of “constant” piece-rate cuts, which usually have led to restriction of production and other expressions of
worker dissatisfaction. In  addition, the wage-restricting measures of the company often have lacked a proper basis; they have not been justified by improvements in technology or organization, and they have been directed toward increasing work intensity—at “sweating the peo­ple,” as the workers p u t it.
Company BB  has preferred a rather irrational type of piece-rate system. Al­though it is an inherent requirem ent of m otivation to give workers proper possi­bilities of m axim izing production in order to earn m axim um  money rewards, the m anagem ent of this company has done just the opposite. It established a lower guaranteed level of wages and pro­duction at 80 percent and also in tro­duced an upper lim it or degressivity plus upper lim it of 100 or 110 percent. Piece rates have been extremely loose for the past decade, and m anagem ent made the first vague steps to revise them only in 1970, after the beginning of our investi­gation. T he  pseudohum anitarian slogan enunciated by m anagem ent was “a ceil­ing on earnings had to be established to defend the workers against themselves, since some workers, in search for profits, were ready to endanger even their own health .” But at the same time the m an­agement adm itted, “conditions are far from being satisfactory in the control of piece rate. At present there is no central organ in the firm that could improve the level of production or standards that are usually very loose, although varying in their level from un it to un it.” Poor managem ent naturally  results in poor work discipline. A considerable part of working hours has been spent in idle con­versation, lunches, and cigarette breaks; and there has been a general practice among workers of m aking various articles for their own household use. Although these practices have been disapproved of
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by management, disciplinary measures have been rarely and only reluctantly taken against them.Company CC has rejected use of a piece-rate system, it has preferred day pay. As a result, work intensity has been lower than  at Company AA,  b u t it has rem ained higher than  at Company BB.  W orkers work at m oderate speeds, and discipline has been acceptable. Sharp conflicts have been rare, and the rate of labor turnover has been more favorable than at either of the other two factories.After having exam ined the efficiency of paym ent systems at the three com­panies, we have come to the following conclusions. Despite the homogeneous aim of the new economic model, there exists a variety of wage plans at state- owned companies, ranging in their effi­ciency from high to very low. T here seems to be a general tendency for re­stricting the level of wages (by cyclical and radical cuts of piece rates at Com­pany AA ,  by the establishm ent of a ceil­ing on earnings at Company BB,  and by the preference of day pay at Company CC).
Labor-M anagement Relations
T he  in troduction and functioning of an incentive system is basically deter­mined by the relations of m anagem ent and labor and by the intram anagem ent and m anagement-labor power play w ith­in an economic organization. In  H unga­ry, the leadership of an economic organ­ization consists of the leaders of three different organizations: the company, the trade union, and the party organization. All of them have formal rights to influ­ence decisions, although the m ajority of such rights naturally  belongs to the com­pany.T he leaders of Companies A A and CC have had the capacity for building an
efficient incentive model. At Company A A the general manager, an autocratic leader, has strict control over the tech­nical-economic adm inistration, a situa­tion which gives him  power that cannot be counterbalanced by the trade union or the party. As he p u t it, he is “shaking the chairs of his departm ent heads all the time, so that the people cannot fall asleep in them .” Company A A  is con­sidered one of the best organized enter­prises in the country. In  its traditional departm ents rationalization of the work process has reached a high level: work groups are maximally specialized, their activities are harmonized, and insufficien­cies in the supply of work duties and m aterial and in the m aintenance of tools and equipm ent are practically unknown. T h e  workers have only one duty— to in­crease production. In  its newly estab­lished departm ents, the company em­ploys the most up-to-date methods of program m ing production. Its personnel departm ent, dealing with labor and wages, is also high above the national standards in its level of efficiency. Its scientific-management-oriented e x p e r ts  have worked out the best possible m eth­ods for the m otivation of workers, rad i­cally substituting new incentive methods for older ones.At Company CC, on the other hand, the leadership seems to be more demo­cratic, bu t also efficient. T he  general manager, the heads of the trade union, and party executives make their decisions in close cooperation: there are no rival­ries in the “triangle,” and the technical- economic adm inistration follows the pol­icy of the collective leadership as closely as it does at Company AA.  T he  schedul­ing of jobs, supply of m aterial, and m aintenance of tools are good.Company BB,  in contrast to the other two enterprises, has a divided leadership.
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T h e  general m anager and his deputy are rivals in controlling the technical-eco­nomic adm inistration, and both look for the support of either the trade un ion or the party. U nder such conditions of in­ternal conflict, m anagem ent cannot make supervisors follow its m aster plan, if indeed there is one. Efficiency is poor. T he  degree of specialization in and the coordination of the work process are un ­satisfactory. W orkers are not supplied w ith the proper am ount of job assign­ments; there are chronic stoppages in  the supply of materials; and m aintenance of tools has been inadequate. According to the records of foremen, in  1967 there were about sixty days when the m ajority of workers could not work because of lack of m aterial. T he  personnel depart­ment, dealing with labor and wages, can­not cope with the problems it faces, as indicated by the looseness of piece rates m entioned above.4T he  quality of m anagem ent is im por­tan t in the in troduction of an incentive 
system, since m anagem ent m ust overcome 
serious difficulties. T he  level of inherited piece rates has been terribly loose in most companies. In  the 1950s the level of wages had been linked by central regula­tions to the am ount of production. T he  companies could increase it only if pro­duction indices (percentages) increased. T hus to get more money to pay workers, managers postponed or completely ne­glected necessary piece-rate cuts.5T h e  negative results of the above prac­tice have been elim inated by continuous
‘P erhaps it  is w orthw hile  to  m en tion  th a t the co n tin u ation  of the S takhanovist m ovem ent and  work com petitions of the 1950s were u nd erm in ed , am ong o th e r th ings, by th e  m anagers’ incapacity  to  ensure p ro p e r env iro n m en t, co n tinuous supply  of du ties an d  m ateria l, etc.“T h is  was one of the reasons for th e  fact th a t Stakhanovists could  som etim es reach  such fa n ­tastic p ro du ctio n  results as 1,800-2,000 percent.
piece-rate cuts at Company AA  and the abolishm ent of the piece-rate system at Company CC. However, the piece-rate system w ith its drawbacks continues at Company BB.
Characteristics of the Labor Force
T h e  quality of labor also shows signif­icant differences at the three companies, influencing the workers’ responses to money incentives.Company A A,  as m entioned earlier, is situated in the center of an agricultural area experiencing rapid  progress in in­dustrialization. Its employees are mostly agricultural in origin, living in villages nearby. They are hardw orking people, ready to make extra efforts for extra money and aim their activities at m axi­mizing their earnings. In  the tradition of the H ungarian peasant’s style of life, “rate-busters” are no t rare among them. T h e ir  behavior also is m otivated by the fact that wages m ean their most im por­tan t source of income; their out-of-fac- tory activities to earn money are negli­gible.Companies BB  and CC, on the other hand, are situated in the capital, and their m anpower is prim arily of industrial origin. T h e  traditions of their industrial past have m ade these people less respon­sive to money incentives. Moreover, in the large industrial area of the capital, services are inadequate and repair work is always in  dem and, netting  such work­ers (sheet-metal workers, electricians, me­chanics, etc.) considerable additional (although generally illegal) income.Geography thus plays an im portant role in the quality  of both m anagem ent and labor. In addition to the effects noted above, we m ust m ention th a t the relationship of supply and dem and in the labor m arket is more favorable for Com­pany A A  than  for the other two enter­
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prises. In  the rura l areas there are only a lim ited num ber of jobs, bu t in the capital, employees have un lim ited  possi­bilities to change jobs.T he  situation in the capital has also been aggravated by a reversal in the flow of manpower. In  the 1950s, labor was pum ped from agriculture in to  industry, from the most rem ote parts of the coun­try to the capital. In  the 1960s, after industrialization had been accelerated in the ru ra l areas, and the agricultural co­operatives had been stabilized, many people left Budapest and went back to their villages. Companies in the capital have suffered because of this m igration, while it has benefitted factories in the country. T h u s the managers of Company AA  have held a stronger position of power in relation to labor than  managers in the capital.O ther m anagem ent power relation­ships have also been affected by location of the enterprise. In  a country town the general m anager of a large factory is always a key figure in local governm ent. General managers in the capital, on the other hand, are relatively m inor figures on the chessboard, since the capital is headquarters for many large enterprises and all national institutions. T he  quality of m anagem ent and labor and power relationships throw m uch light on the problems discussed, b u t a great part of the companies’ behavior still remains obscure. W hy has Company AA  carried out constant piece-rate cuts, “sweating” its labor, provoking serious in ternal con­flicts, and often m aking its incentive system counterproductive? How could Company BB  exist w ith such in ternal conditions, if efficiency were nationally stressed and profits represented as its m ain indicator? W hy has Company CC 
rejected the piece-rate system, despite favorable technological and organization­
al characteristics and the relatively strong position of its management?
T he  Com panies’ Economic Position
T h e  factors discussed above have cre­ated possibilities for managers to act to reform  their incentive systems or have prevented them  from doing so. But they have not m otivated them. M otivation has been provided by profit incentives (an issue to be discussed later) and by the overall economic position of the enterprises.On the basis of various macro condi­tions, the managements of the three companies have been subjected to pres­sures of varying force in their search for profits and efficiency. T h e  question is w hether outside influences have been able to outweigh the m anagers’ reluc­tance to upset the existing relations of interests and powers w ith in their organ­izations by reform ing wage incentives and changing the financial positions of groups, thus possibly provoking serious conflicts.T h e  m anagem ent of Company AA  has been forced, by the nature of its products, to use prices in the in ternational m arket as a guide and has tried to choose a profit-maximizing package in its produc- tion-possibility set. T he  decision was m ade to cease m anufacturing railway coaches and undertake production of heavy-duty diesel engines for buses and trucks. T h e  com pany’s technology was too antiquated  to make railway coach m anufacturing profitable, and state sub­sidies were being withdrawn. In  addi­tion, dem and for coaches was limited, and several other companies produced them under more favorable technological circumstances. However, im m ediate ces­sation of production was no t possible; w ithdraw al took the form of gradual re­duction of ou tpu t. Accordingly, manage­
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m ent felt that cuts in production costs were necessary. Since investm ent in new equipm ent was not indicated under the circumstances, it decided to reduce labor costs. T he  m ethod selected was to en­courage workers to make more intensive efforts by the help of a radical piece-rate system. T his has been a difficult pro­cedure for these managers to follow, since they have had to confront the natural resistance of workers, bu t they have had no other choice.Company BB  has been in a more favor­able position. A lthough the scheduling of jobs, the m aintenance of tools, the supply of m aterial, and the technology 
are all inadequate— that is, the entire 
production operation should be unprofit­
able, according to the standards of the 
in ternational m arket— the company can still attain  rather high profits. T his has 
been possible prim arily because of its monopolistic position in the home m ar­
ket and control over prices. Second, its 
products (medical instrum ents) are con­
sidered to be of “great necessity for the 
country,” and it therefore enjoys large 
state subsidies. Consequently, m anage­m ent has taken few steps toward ra tion­
alization of the work process and has not been hasty in establishing radical wage 
incentives for the workers. I t  has been 
engaged more in “m anipulating” profits 
than in increasing efficiency. M anage­
m ent’s lack of interest in efficiency has 
been an im portant factor in the creation of the distorted form of a piece-rate sys­
tem with its upper ceiling on earnings. T he  established lower lim it (guaranteed 
level), on the other hand, has served as a 
defense of the workers against the likely 
negative effects on earnings of insuffi­
ciencies in the supply of m aterial and of 
poor m aintenance. I t has provided a
comfortable position for the leadership of the company.8Company CC’s position in the home m arket is also a monopolistic one, and it can sell its products (special electrical equipm ent) on favorable terms in the world m arket as well. Also, fixed prices have been set for them  in the home m ar­ket. T h e  company is relatively new, well- organized, and equipped with m odern means of production, thus ensuring high efficiency even at a m edium  level of work intensity and discipline. T h e  m anage­m ent has not been interested in m otivat­ing labor more radically; rather, it has concentrated on innovations in technol­ogy, on sales, on more favorable m arket terms, etc.T h e  economic position of the com­panies, as an im portant factor in m otivat­ing managers to introduce efficient in ­centives for labor, however, cannot be discussed separately from the role of certain restrictive measures by the na­tional government.
Government Restrictions
T he  governm ent has urged the in tro­duction of efficient wage incentives, bu t at the same time, by its restrictive regula­tions, has m ade realization of this goal difficult, sometimes practically impossible.T he  central agencies have strict con­trol over wages per capita at all state- owned companies and have set them on a roughly uniform  level in all factories. T he  aim is to avoid certain possible negative by-products of the new economic model: first of all, the possibility of job­lessness. Joblessness is unknow n in H u n­gary, bu t a price is paid in low ou tput per worker. Central control over per capita wages prevents companies from
“In te rn a l clashes and  rivalries in  m anagem ent do  n o t seem u n re la ted  to  th is  "com fortab le” position .
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employing smaller well-paid work forces stim ulated by adequate wage differen­tials. Instead managers are required to employ larger m edium -paid work forces which are not properly m otivated. If a company wants to increase production, it cannot pay extra money to its (often idle) workers bu t instead m ust look for addi­tional manpower.T he  trade union, because of its heri­tage and present structure, cannot under­take the task of protecting the workers. It has united all sorts of employees in its ranks and leadership, from m anual work­ers to m iddle and top m anagement. It has no clearly ou tlined goals, based on realistic considerations of the present relations of interests and powers w ithin the companies. T he  necessary national “centralization” of the defense of work­ers’ interests is one of the m ain contrib­utors to the present state of wages.According to the central regulations, even a very slight increase in  wages per capita is very heavily taxed: it has to be covered by the share of profits to be turned into incentive bonuses. But this part of the profit is usually so low that the sum spent on wage increases (extract­ing all profits from managers) can have only negligible results, and any further increase can make the company “bank­rupt.” For example, at Company AA ,  the share of profits to be divided in 1968 meant a ten-days’ pay for the workers and about forty-days’ pay for the m an­agers. T hus the companies that have to achieve their growing production targets must invest in technical equipm ent, im ­prove their organization, and attract additional manpower, resulting in a large artificial dem and for workers in the labor market. In addition, the flourishing agri­cultural and industrial cooperatives, which have rem ained untouched by cen­tral measures of wage restriction, have
produced a dem and for workers. T hu s a curious situation has developed. T he  large state-owned companies, often well- equipped, well-organized, and highly productive, cannot rival the small, poorly equipped, poorly organized enterprises in the labor m arket. T he  best skilled workers depart from the factories and take jobs at the cooperatives th a t can pay often twice as much as big companies.T o  avoid m isunderstanding, it m ust be m entioned that the financial situation of the state-owned companies, in general, is not worse than  that of the cooperatives. They can offer several conveniences to the employees, which cooperatives cannot (i.e., w orkm en’s hostels, r e s t a u r a n t s ,  washing rooms, sports fields, etc.). But workers seem to be much more interested in obtaining income directly in wages than indirectly through benefits.T h e  big companies, tied by regulations and at the same time pressed by the high rate of labor turnover, desperately try to cope with the situation. T hey work out various (often illegal) solutions to break through the fixed level of wages, bu t these efforts usually fail. T he  companies may increase m inim um  wages, bu t at the same time (the average being fixed), they have to decrease m axim um  wages. As a result, the scale of wage differentials be­comes even narrower; this hurts the skilled workers, and the lack of proper wage differentials underm ines the func­tioning of the wage plan. U nder such conditions no wage plan can work effi­ciently.
M anagement’s Dilemma
T he  contradiction between m anage­m ent’s desperate efforts to stim ulate labor and its need to m ain tain  the fixed level of wages per capita is best m anifest­ed in the case of Company A A. T his contradictory policy contributes to the
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inconsistent features of the com pany’s incentive measures and to the practice of constant and usually unjustified piece- rate cuts. T he  same frustration of the fixed level of wages also has contributed to the existence of the pseudoefficient wage plan of Company BB  (with a ceil­ing on earnings) and to the complete re­jection of a piece-rate system by Com­pany CC.In  economic terms, the centrally set level of wages per capita fluctuates around the “m inim um  shutdown po in t” and “m axim um  shutdown po in t” at the same time. I t fails to attract labor, bu t it increases the risk of the company becom­ing “bankrup t.”Of course, shutdown in a centrally planned model cannot be understood in its original sense. T h e  breaking of central regulations endangers not so m uch profits as the position of managers, who (if they can do so, as in the case of Companies BB  and CC) refrain from the hopeless effort of building up  a really efficient wage plan for labor.T he  crucial question is, why do the central agencies set wages per capita on roughly the same level at all engineering companies; why is the share of profits to be divided so low?It is obvious that the establishm ent of proper wage differentials among the workers requires, because of the inherent logic of the system, proper differentiation of the level of wages per capita among the companies as well.Wage differences in labor m ust be based, in principle, on the work done. Differences between the wage levels of companies theoretically m ust be based on efficiency. But the trouble is that effi­ciency (resulting not so m uch from the activities of managers and workers bu t from the past arbitrary decisions of cen­tral organs) has to be, at least for the
moment, excluded from consideration.7 But no other reliable indicator exists. T h a t is why the sum of incentive bonuses from profits also has had to be limited. Furtherm ore, that is why the managers’ incentive bonuses have not been consis­tent with the companies’ production and profit achievements and have been kept small, giving little  incentive to managers who have usually endeavored to score only “relatively good,” “acceptable,” or “generally satisfactory” results. T he  pres­ent obstacles to increased efficiency, the insufficiencies of money incentives, the unreliability of a profit indicator, the fear of social injustices and conflicts, the re­strictive measures on wages and profits to be divided, in a sense, seem to create a vicious circle, the breaking of which is an enormous task for the future.T hus, even if managers sought an optim um  solution in wage incentives, it could not result in an efficient system. But as managers naturally have sought only a satisfying, acceptable solution, the efficiency of wage plans has become even worse.
Conclusions
On the basis of the lim ited survey re­ported here, we are unable to analyze the effects of the new decentralized economic model on the behavior of managers and
T h i s  practice n a tu ra lly  discourages th e  m an ­agers of th e  best com panies. O ne of th em  told us, “W e p u t d ifferent sums of m oney in to  the com m on pool, and  we have to take o u t equal ones from  it .” T h is  problem  is com pounded  by the o th e r difficulties resu ltin g  from  the necessary cooperation  of m ore an d  less efficient enterprises. C om pany AA  is in  a relatively favorable position, because it has developed in to  a large vertical factory, having its own m etallurgica l d ep artm en t, etc., b u t the work of o th e r com panies is often  th w arted  by la te  deliveries of com ponents or deliveries in  poor condition . C om pany BB, in th a t respect, is in  th e  w orst position  since it m anu fac tu res  several tho usan d  types of products p u ttin g  it  in  a ju n g le  of co opera tional diffi­culties.
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business organizations in  general.8 We have om itted several im portant areas of company activity (investments, trading, financial transactions), so we m ight focus our attention on the relatively narrow problem of the in troduction of efficient incentive systems. A few observations on the overall operation of the reform  may be offered. D uring the first two years of the new economic model, the central regulations could not adapt themselves flexibly enough to the different micro- and macro-socioeconomic circumstances of the various companies (technology, organization, in ternal power structure, market position, price policy, etc.). T he  phenomenon is best m anifested in  the uniform level of wages per capita set for the companies. T h e  central regulations could not be adapted quickly enough to the constantly changing circumstances. The phenom enon is best indicated by the companies’ wage level moving around the maximum  and m inim um  “shutdown points” at the same time. T he  central regulations have no t been coordinated properly (as in the case of wage control over state-owned companies and coopera­tives).In addition to the insufficiencies of central regulations, the heritage of the past, the level of the organization of work, backward technology, the back­ward and sometimes unprofitable struc­ture of products have also m eant serious obstacles to the in troduction of workable and productive wage plans, illustrating
8An analysis of the H u n g arian  econom ic re ­form has been recently  com pleted  by D avid Granick of the U niversity  of W isconsin for the In te rn ation a l D evelopm ent R esearch C en ter a t Indiana U niversity. T h e  pap er, from  the econo­m ist’s p o in t of view, con tribu tes  significantly  to the au th o rs’ a rgu m en t in  th is  article.
that the transition from a less efficient centralized model to a more efficient de­centralized one is a long and painful process.O ur results have also shown that the establishm ent of proper incentives for managers is a serious problem  even in the new model of the economy.T h e  conflict of efficiency and human- itarianism  seems to rem ain existent even in the decentralized economic model. T h e  central regulations have contributed greatly to the failure of wage incentives, although they have protected workers against joblessness and other possible negative effects of the acceleration of productivity. In  this regard they are a success in the short run. In  the long run, however, the present hum anitarian  pref­erences would seem to underm ine the efficiency which is the m ain guarantee for achieving the hum anitarian  goals.R adical changes in the economic sys­tem of H ungary have to face serious natu ral obstacles because of the heritage of the past and the restraints of the pres­ent. Critical restraints on progress in ­clude the rejection of the possibility of unem ploym ent, rap id  increases in  con­sum er prices, and the exclusion of any other form of pressure placed on im por­tan t social groups including labor and managers. But neither the heritage of the past nor the restraints of the present should become absolute; w ithin the given limits there is possibility to make further steps forward. T o  decrease the negative by-products of the decentralized model, it seems necessary to make central regu­lations more differentiated, more flexible, more coordinated, and above all, scienti­fically better founded on analysis of the functioning of economic organizations.
